


IBM CorkCon Mar 10th 2016

Dylan Smyth Nimbus Centre for Embedded Systems Research


Conventional Networking

- Each device is configured separately
- Each devices makes forwarding decisions




Conventional Networking

• A Control and Data plane exists on each device




Software-Defined Networking

Control and Data planes are decoupled




Software-Defined Networking

- Decision making is centralized to a "Controller"
- Data forwarding is left to the "Forwarding Devices"




Software-Defined Networking

Controller has a centralized view of the network topology




Software-Defined Networking

- Forwarding is defined by 'flow entries' in 'flow tables'
- Flow entries contain:
- · Packet matching information (Port, src/dst IP, etc.)
- · Actions to perform (Forward, drop, etc.)
- Statistical Information for flows




Software-Defined Networking

 Controllers insert, update, and delete flow table entries



Software-Defined Networking

• Communicates via a "Southbound" API



OpenFlow

• A control protocol used for communication between the Data Plane and the Control Plane.




Software-Defined Networking

- SDN networks can be "Proactive" or "Reactive"
- "Table Miss" When a packet does not match any flow table entries


Software-Defined Networking

- When a Table Miss occurs:
 - \cdot Switch sends data to controller.
 - \cdot Controller determines what to do
 - \cdot Updates switches in the network accordingly




Software-Defined Networking

 Controllers decision is influenced by the requirements of Applications




Software-Defined Networking




 Applications communicate requirements to the controller

Software-Defined Networking



• Communicates via a "Northbound" API (e.g. REST)

Software-Defined Networking




Security Opportunities

- Security can be implemented as Applications
- Security requirements can be maintained centrally
- Flow entries can be inserted to block connections or assist monitoring

Security Opportunities

- Detection mechanisms possible for DOS, Worm propagation, etc.
- Ability to actively update rules in the network presents opportunities (Self Defending Network)

Security Challenges




Security Challenges

- Controller is a single point of failure
- TLS usage is not required for OpenFlow
- Malicious/Vulnerable Applications
- Flows could be engineered to bypass access control
- Side-Channel attacks to determine flow rules

Security Challenges

SDN Security Attack Vectors



Questions

Image Sources

[1]

https://www.sdxcentral.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/manipulated-openflow -switch.jpg

[2] https://tele-4642-group-4.wikispaces.com/file/view/openflow%201.jpg/512890 232/openflow%201.jpg

[3] https://www.opennetworking.org

[4] https://s3f.iti.illinois.edu/usrman/openflow.html

[5] http://core0.staticworld.net/images/article/2014/10/sdn-sec-1d-100527554-larg e.idge.jpg